Tuesday, March 8, 2016

The fixation with numbers for political gains


In such times of political salience, opinions of experts are of high demand. Politicians are very welcoming of any information they can use to support their political interests. The academe consisting of scholars and experts have a very critical role to play and therefore it is very crucial that they exercise caution in their writing. I write this post in response to various articles coming out bearing their assessments of various regimes – Marcos, Aquino, and even Arroyo. I aim not to refute their claims because that would take time and to fight numbers, I’d need to present mine. Rather, I merely want to pose questions to writers and analysts who have written or are planning to write such articles and this goes not only to the anti-Marcos academia or anti-GMA academia but to all people wanting to do the compare-and-contrast piece. I also want to send my message to readers for them not to take things at face value.
Numbers don’t lie

True enough, numbers don’t lie. And so it is very tempting to check various numbers like the GDP growth, amount of external debt, debt ratios, expenditures, balance of payments, credit ratings and the like. So what many usually do is to pick numbers corresponding to the years covered by a particular administration and without much thought – attribute these to the administration during that period. I present several points why such assessment may be grossly flawed.

The truth is – policies and programs do take time to effect. Programs or policies implemented within a 4-year or 6-year rule may produce benefits that can only be felt 10-20 years after initial implementation. Of course in the 20-year rule by Pres. Marcos, there is a better chance of seeing the effects within that timeframe. But even then, infrastructures like major dams, roads, and bridges built by this regime in the 1970s and early 1980s still benefit many to this day. Likewise, airport terminals built or rehabilitated during the Arroyo administration may have been instrumental in the arrival of more tourists or the more efficient air transport today. To attribute these to the present administration just because we can only feel and see such effects now is just not fair. So this becomes an issue of calculation. In your cost-benefit analysis, if you even conduct one, for instance, how do you conduct your valuation of benefits of major infrastructures where the gains to the people lie beyond one’s regime? As mentioned earlier, many of the infrastructures that Marcos or Gloria Arroyo spent on are being utilized to these days. These also have to be considered before one can say anything about cost-effectiveness of borrowings.
Establishing causality

Likewise, and more importantly, the policy process including implementation does not happen in a void. In writing or reading articles that attribute effects to a particular factor – in this case a particular regime’s policy, one needs to be careful about causality. Is the analysis rigorous enough to establish causality? If you say that a particular regime did so bad, borrowed too much, that the economy has suffered so much, you are saying that this regime has ‘caused’ such bad outcome. In school, especially in graduate school, we are taught to draw our conclusions only after careful and rigorous analysis, more so if what we are claiming is causality. Some would argue that we should be strict with the causality requirements only in more critical fields like medicine. I disagree, all analyses that attempt to make attributions must be scientifically founded. Otherwise, we should not forget to highlight the caveats.

There are 3 requirements before one can establish causality – the temporal requirement, correlation, and lastly, the absence or ruling out of confounding factors. The first two are easier to establish relative to the third. Temporal requirement merely asks that the cause we claim happens before the effect. There is a problem if they happen simultaneously. The second one asks for a correlation – meaning if authoritative regime is equal to chaos or economic recession, then the opposite must also be true, without authoritative regime, we get a better economic outcome. We look into the entire history of the country and if we see such pattern then there is a correlation. Since it is widely accepted that there is only one authoritative regime so far, this is quite difficult to establish. What one can do is to look for other countries’ experiences. And believe me, this is yet to be established as it has stirred a long and continuing debate among economists and political scientists all over the world.

The last requirement and perhaps the most important in this discussion is the absence of confounding factors. This has haunted every analyst because it is very difficult to rule our other possible explanations. In layman’s term – it means that when we attribute the problems of the economy to the policies of a particular regime, we must ensure that no other factors – no external shocks, no natural and man-made calamities, no domestic factors like rebellion or internal conflict, and no foreign influences or interventions have affected the outcome we are looking at. Only after we have determined that these factors did not confound the outcome can we truly say that it is caused by the policies. So, have we ruled them out?
Look more closely

There is also what we call construct validity. There is a construct validity problem if the program we’re looking at was not implemented as it should be, if ever implemented, because of whatever reasons or factors prevailing during those times. In short, de facto was different from de jure. Blaming it is of no use. This means that you cannot attribute the outcome to something that is either incompletely implemented or not implemented at all. An example is the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant, why blame the Marcos regime for the debt it incurred to construct the plant, hence our failure to benefit from it, when it was abandoned by succeeding administrations? The same goes to other projects that were in the pipeline but were abandoned by administrations that succeeded, and these are projects that Marcos had started to build with the billions of dollars he borrowed.

Meanwhile, looking at mere patterns of government expenditures, debts, among others, fails to account at where the money went to – does it comprise of big time infrastructures or dole out expenses? If one regime borrowed and spent $100 million while another had $2 billion, what do we make of this? Do we look at the needs met? Do we look at the quality of spending? I don’t see such in the articles I’ve read, only outright attributions with not much deep analysis.
What to do

So how should we do our assessments then? I’m no expert but in my humble opinion, I suggest all we can do is to make an account of outputs vis-à-vis inputs and not attribute broad outcomes to regimes because outcomes are a function of so many factors not even an authoritative regime can control. It is so easy to credit or discredit a person depending on where your allegiances are. Understandably, even scholars and researchers like us have our own political leanings and principles. Nevertheless, we should not allow ourselves to use our craft loosely just to arrive at a conclusion that supports a particular political agenda to the extent that we sacrifice sound analysis and our reputation as researchers or academics.

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